Startup Therapy Podcast

Episode #197

Ryan Rutan: Welcome back to another episode of the Startup therapy podcast. This is Ryan Rotan joined as always by Will Schroeder, my friend, the founder and CEO of startups dot com. Will, there's a lot going on in the markets right now. It frothy times uh fundraising has, has seen some kind of crazy, crazy. Well, everybody's seen crazy shit happen but in, in the fundraising space especially, but there's something going on that's getting a lot more attention right now that we're seeing a lot of companies kind of over their skis if you will and bad things are happening as a result, right? There's all of a sudden, it turns out these companies with these massive valuations are revaluing at pennies on the dollar. And it turns out that a lot of that money they raised was on fake growth, right? But there are a couple of misconceptions around this. I think we want to deal with today and just kind of expose the narrative of how that happens. Why that happens, why we enter into this knowingly to go and achieve fake growth? And what do we really mean by that?

Wil Schroter: I think that everybody's thinking that faith fake growth is tantamount to some sort of investor level scam, you know, the their nose kind of thing and that does happen like that does happen. But I think what we need to understand for people on the outside looking in trying to understand how so many of these companies have raised so much money and have grown so much, but generally don't have revenue or don't have nearly the revenue to support what they're doing. And like, how does that happen? And so now they're doing these massive reductions in force these rifts laying off gobs of people. And everyone's saying, how could they not see this happening? Who was saying that the people just got laid off? They're like, what happened? Like I thought you were this hot company that was growing like crazy and that this was the next big thing and now I don't have a job. Like, what were you doing? What were you thinking at the top?

Ryan Rutan: Yeah, I think there's like almost an implied irresponsibility, right? And that's not necessarily the case. Yeah, exactly.

Wil Schroter: And what I think we should talk about today is this is very deliberate. This doesn't come out of nowhere. It, it wasn't like, oh my God, I can't believe we hire all these people and had all these offices. Where did this come from? Or I can't believe we didn't have revenue. Like we knew we didn't have revenue right

Ryan Rutan: there. Aren't founders sitting out there with their boards and like, gosh, guys, I was reading Google Analytics all wrong for, like, for years. Sorry. Right. That's not what's happening here. Right. So, so what is happening?

Wil Schroter: The first thing I think we need to understand is that when you're raising money at that level, let's define what that level is. So, folks that are listening aren't thinking to themselves. Oh, I guess it's the same as what I'm doing. It's probably not, probably not. There are two kind of, yeah, there's two kind of major forks in the road. Super

Ryan Rutan: important point there though, right. Which is that as you scale the amount that you're funding, you scale the amount that you can get over your skis, right? If you're raising a million dollars, you're not gonna end up with 500 more people than you need. Right? If you raise $50 million you may well end up with way more people than you. So, there is a point of scale here at which this really starts to matter.

Wil Schroter: So let's talk about it. Let's talk about where your roads aren't the same anymore where you might be raising money and somebody else might be raising money. And Ryan, I, let's, let's have you and I be those two different kind of paths, right?

Ryan Rutan: Ok. I'm gonna raise a ton. I'm just gonna raise a ton.

Wil Schroter: I just gave you the, the responsible path. Yes. Yeah. Ok. You're gonna pay growth guy and I'm gonna be revenue guy and here's what happens. We both go out and raise money. We raise, let's just say a reasonable seed round. We raised $2 million or something like that. All is well, but you take a different path. You say I'm not gonna focus so much on near term revenue or near term kind of requirements. Instead I'm gonna focus on how can we get as big as possible now, big as possible. Just means we hire lots of people. We spent lots of money in ads and we built a lot of infrastructure that has nothing to do with whether or not there's any revenue attached

Ryan Rutan: to it. Yeah. What about the surfing and meditation?

Wil Schroter: Oh, yeah. You, you, you also have to have your, uh, your ma company retreats that's gotta have got a fund for that. Meanwhile, me and some other co-founder are sitting there trying to build a business on revenue where we make a little bit of profit. We reinvest that profit. We hopefully make a little bit more

Ryan Rutan: profit. Oh, cute. A lifestyle business.

Wil Schroter: Oh, how cute. Yeah, the money making business and good luck with that. Yeah. And so we're sitting here going well, ok, we can't grow that fast. We can't hire a giant team of engineers or we can't have that crazy office space because we haven't made the money yet. And it's a very logical way of thinking, but you take it from a different standpoint, you say, look, I don't want to basically hope it, that we might be able to make some profit and might be able to turn that into some more money. I want to build a massive enterprise now. And so you go the route of I'm gonna raise as much money as possible with the thesis that if I build this massive amount of infrastructure for this big bet that the money will come and there are quite a few investors out there that are willing to fund that. And I think that's what we need to talk about. We need to talk about why, how, how are you able to raise so much money knowingly that your revenue is not what it needs to be now. It may never be like, how does anybody even process that discussion?

Ryan Rutan: Yeah. Yeah, I think it, but it is important, right? Because that's the reality of it. But

Wil Schroter: what I think people don't understand is in order to raise that kind of money, the massive rounds of capital. And when I say massive rounds of capital, I'm not talking about five or $10 million I'm talking 50 100 a billion dollars at those levels. There's a few things, most people don't understand. The first is there are very few people surprisingly raising that kind of money. So just to begin with once you say I wanna do a $50 million round, you may not be successful, but there are very few people like you raising with a story like that. And so you, you might zoom out and go well, how is Ryan's story any different than my story? The difference is Ryan's talking about and, and we'll use the example Ryan's talking about opening up 1000 lemonade stands all at once. You're talking about raising one or, or creating one. That's the difference. So Ryan says, I need to have a National chain of lemonade stands and I need to have it overnight so that we can IP O within five years, you're showing up with your pitch deck saying, hey, I want to open up one lemonade stand. This phone is doing well and if that does well, we'll open up another, the investors that are looking to invest at that higher level are like, yeah, ok, good luck with that. I'm in interested in Ryan's deal. It might not work. He might not ever get the revenue to support it, but he's a hell of a lot more likely to be able to get to a point where he gets to an IP O with the bigger vision of I open up 1000 lemonade stands. And this is where our story begins. Our story begins with Ryan takes a different path. And the second thing we got to understand is that it's not about how much revenue we have, it's how much momentum we have. So Ryan, let's talk about what momentum looks like. And why that's so attractive to investors. So, if you think about where we would spend gobs of money, 50 to $100 million let's say, in a single round. Where do you picture that going?

Ryan Rutan: Yeah, I mean, it goes to, it goes to a lot of bodies for growth on, on a lot of fronts, right? But if we're talking about something where there is physical rollout to various markets, right? Staffing is a is a huge piece of it, right? There may be, you know, physical assets involved. We really are building lemonade stands and there's a whole, there's a whole bunch of real estate, there's a, there's infrastructure that has to be built there, right? So these are, these are big dollar amounts. This isn't something that we can kind of scale from a single point, it's not software, right? So there's a lot of duplicated costs in order to make the big land grab, even with something like uh if you look at Uber as an example, right? Somebody that went out for a big land grab and said like in order to be viable, we have to be ubiquitous, right? We can't be an app that works in one town, we gotta be as fast as we can so that we maintain that screen real estate. And even with them, there was a ton of cost in market by market roll out because there's still a physical aspect to that product, even though they don't necessarily own that physical infrastructure. They still have to marshal it. Right. So, massive amounts of cost in order to do that.

Wil Schroter: So let's, let's play that out. It always starts with staffing. That's always, typically, you know, the first one, certain businesses have a capital cost or things that they're buying. If you look at a similar business like birds, scooters, they had to buy scooters. They had R and D obviously, but they had to buy a lot of scooters, right? And they had to put them in places and that required a lot of money in a very short period of time. Now, what happens is when we know that we're gonna scale that fast, we need an entire massive man management and middle management layer all overnight. So tons of huge salaries and we're recruiting like crazy. We need a place to put these people not as much anymore, but you used to. So we're gonna need a giant office. We're gonna hire 34 or 500 people. We need a huge office. We're signed some crazy lease for it. It's gotta be beautiful because people want to come there. Right. And so all of a sudden that 1st 50 $100 million goes like that. It's instantly gone. We paid it to recruiters to places where we're trying to find our office space. We've obviously done a recruiting bonuses. You know, it's all of these things. We haven't even gotten to the ad budget yet. So as we're building up this massive infrastructure to open up 1000 lemonade stands and all the people and, and all the capital costs that takes. Now we gotta market this thing. The whole world needs to know our brand pretty much overnight in order to support this level of growth. So now we're looking at our CD E rounds, we're raising 203 104 $100 million sometimes as much as a billion dollars in a single round. Now, let's pause there. How the hell Ryan did you raise 4 to $500 million? And you still don't have revenue?

Ryan Rutan: Damn good lemonade, man. Really, really good lemonade.

Wil Schroter: That's very limited. The answer is when I get to that level, when I start running around the capital markets, talking to V CS trying to raise money, there are a small number of funds that have a massive amount of money and they have to deploy that money and they're not looking to write $5 million checks like like, like I'd be looking for is as a guy who's trying to run my company on profit, they're trying to write checks of 203 104 $100 million at a time. And it turns out in order to deploy that cash, there's like 20 people at any time that are looking for that much money and can and have the infrastructure to deploy it. Yeah, so inevitably I'm actually trying to beat out other investors to be able to deploy my money into that deal, which still makes no money because what you've created, what you've created is you've created momentum by hiring all those people by picking up the office space, by running those ad budgets, by telling that story, you've put yourself in a rarified air of the few companies that have the capacity, the vision and the infrastructure to be able to deploy that much money to

Ryan Rutan: burn cash at scale. Right. Yeah, exactly.

Wil Schroter: You know, people say, how do, how do we work, you know, take a $10 billion investment from Softbank because they're the only person that could, there were so few people at that level of the game that could possibly be the recipients of that much money because they have their infrastructure to do something with it. How did you become that person by raising a bunch of money and creating a bunch of bullshit infrastructure uh before you got to revenue? Yep.

Ryan Rutan: Yep. Yep. Interesting how that works, isn't it? Now, let's

Wil Schroter: pause there though because if you didn't understand any of that, I, I if you never heard about this, if you didn't understand that there were only a few places that could put money into a few places, it just doesn't make sense.

Ryan Rutan: Yeah, you look at it from the outside and you're like, yeah. Yeah. And I think that's why people get that misconception, right? But what about revenue? Right. What about revenue? Yeah. Yeah, it's, it's the, the assumption I think for people looking at from the outside in is that it's smoke and mirrors and that it was some sort of, you know, Tom Fuller, right? It isn't, everybody is well aware that this is still a bet, but you kind of to, to circle back to what you said, right. We could go back to the tale of two startups where you're going to build and do it linearly sequentially after the next, after the next, the the other one is just simply going to multiply that by however many times you want to scale it, right? So if we want to do it in 1000 locations, we're gonna multiply that by 1000. So therefore, for we have this model, this infrastructure again kind of a bullshit infrastructure because in the same way that you're gonna take that one location and you're gonna try to take that and turn it into something profitable. It's gonna start without profit and you're gonna have a burn rate and you're gonna try to, you know, overcome your burn rate, turn that into something profit through, through starting with revenue. You're gonna try to do the same thing but 1000 times over. So yes, it increases the outcome exponentially, also increases the complexity exponentially and the burn rate exponentially, right? So all of these things are happening at scale and this is where these companies, when it works. It looks fantastic. Right. Grand slam home run, whatever you wanna call it when it doesn't, why is it an interesting catastrophe to pick apart in the postmortem?

Wil Schroter: Yeah. Yeah, we do a Tale of two startups. Let's look at Uber and let's look at, we work, you know, who were the two highest valued companies in their heyday going public at about the same time. And by the way, we work did have revenue just to be clear. They had places that people came, it, it did a lot of revenue actually. So it wasn't a total theos kind of smoke and mirrors kind of thing. Now, granted he was playing it up. But again, we keep coming back to you. You gotta understand why I think the narrative from the outside. And I think you touched on this is that the founders are just being irresponsible or the investors are just being irresponsible. They know exactly what they're doing because when it works, they look like heroes, when it works and you push everything to the limit and you create Uber on the other side, you're a hero, right? The markets reward you, but you push all of those same limits and it doesn't work. And just to give you a sense for it, Adam Newman took the road show. That was we work to all the investment banks getting ready for his IP O and it was considered to be one of the the hottest IP Os, there was now at the time, you had incredibly smart people behind that company funding that company. So it wasn't like he was just, you know, flipping overnight, right? This was a very deliberate playbook and they knew how to make it work. He goes to all the investment banks and they start looking at the numbers and the projections and just being like this is just insane like you're talking about this thing being a technology company. It's like, dude, you own real estate. There are very specific multiples for this business. And yeah, you're trying to talk about this thing. He basically tried to, to pull the wool over everybody's eyes and say this was something that it's not. And at the end of the day, he was just a landlord. He was a very expensive landlord, right? With a lot of cash, but just a landlord, right? Telling the

Ryan Rutan: landlord story, perhaps the best landlord storyteller of all time,

Wil Schroter: you know, something that's really funny about everything we talk about here is that none of it is new. Everything you're dealing with right now has been done 1000 times before you, which means the answer already exists. You may just not know it, but that's ok. That's kind of what we're here to do. We talk about this stuff on the show, but we actually solve these problems all day long at groups dot startups dot com. So if any of this sounds familiar, stop guessing about what to do. Let us just give you the answers to the test and be done with it. Unbelievable. And the truth is there was a business there. It just wasn't the business that he raised for. The business he raised for. We, we're gonna get tech a kind of multiples for being a landlord, which again, the east coast guys and the west coast guys are very different. The west coast guys will invest based on what it could be. And the east coast guys invest based on what it is. And when the story came around to the East coast guys, you know the Wall Street, they looked at it for what it is and they trounced them. Now I say that to say Adam Newman did everything right up until the point that he got called to the carpet for it. He raised the huge rounds. He had the big momentum, he was attracting all the top staff, he was getting all of the press, everything was going his way. He did the playbook perfectly where he failed. Where Travis at Uber didn't is he could set up the story to say, yeah, we're not making money now but,

Ryan Rutan: but right here's how we turn the

Wil Schroter: corner. Yeah. And Adam didn't quite simply right. That's kind of where it blows up. But going back to what we're thinking, we now look at that and go well, then we work in bodes and then there's documentaries about Adam's downfall and, and what a, you know, incredibly uh bullshit sham it was. And what I keep saying I was like, you know, if it works, you're like, he's a genius. He risked it all. We tell great stories about that with our last podcast. It was about the incredible stories, you know, founders get to tell their legendary stories. But when it doesn't, when it doesn't, the,

Ryan Rutan: the, the difference between the Victor and the villain is only clear in the hindsight, right? Like that's, I think that's the the thing and, and again, like there's nothing villainous about the approach, right? He did, he sort of played by the rules of the game and did what he needed to do to be able to create that type of momentum. The thing that will still kind of, you know, bug me a little bit in that case is how did he think they were going to turn the corner on Sass like multiples when it was a hard asset game, right? Real estate doesn't scale, right? He was like, we were gonna add floors, right? We're gonna go vertical. Oh OK, cool. I don't know.

Wil Schroter: Well, I want to point out though because everybody assumes that maybe the founders, you know, said doing something or the V C, you know, created this, this whole plan for all the founders that I've talked to that have been through this. Here's what they say they say holy shit in retrospect, I should have never done this. In retrospect, obviously, this was a terrible idea. They're not nearly the mustache twit, you know, uh Twitter twiddling villains, twiddling villains that, that, that people think they are. But what they say is they say at that time, all the signals pointed to go. And so I went, every person in the board was saying I need to scale as fast as possible. I was getting rewarded with geometrically more money for scaling as fast as possible. In some cases, maybe I was taking some cash off the table for doing this. So personally, I was literally being rewarded. In some cases, I was getting a massive uptick in the valuation which increased the value to all the people that have put money into my deal as well as my staff. Exactly

Ryan Rutan: the staff. That's an important one, right? That's a really important one, right? Because you're hiring all these people and you're increasing their share value, right? So it does feel like everything is going the right direction until the minute. It's obvious that it's not. But you know, said this a couple of weeks ago, these things tend to be big surprises in a lot of ways, right? Like everything seemed like it was going right until it wasn't, but being able to predict that and know, right? Everything's clear in hindsight, but for as clear as it is in hindsight, in foresight, it was damn near impossible, right? Visibility less than 100 yards, right? This is the nature of the beast.

Wil Schroter: It does share some of the basic principles of a Ponzi scheme and I'm not calling it a Ponzi scheme. I'm just saying this is how a Ponzi scheme works. Ponzi scheme works because there's always another sucker, right? It stops working when there's no longer another sucker. So it works like this, let's say right now, you, you and I teamed up for this Goliath and our lemonade, uh Starbucks. And the first round, you know, we raised 15 million bucks in, let's say an A round. But the second round markets so hot, we pick up $100 million in our B round and now we're getting heavily rewarded. BC are trying to track us down to figure out how we're gonna take their money. And now we open up for AC round, we do $500 million and we're raising that money at some insane multiple maybe we're at $7 billion in evaluation. And by the way, we started this company two years ago, ok. Now we're looking at successive rounds and we're looking at, oh my God, there's gonna be a billion dollar round in front of us when all of that just happened, happened in lightening fast succession and we're being constantly rewarded for raising more money, creating more momentum, making these big hires, making these media splashes getting our brand out there. There is no single signal that's telling us to stop doing this correct. At the same time, all sorts of people that we brought on Ryan, everybody that we brought on from our earliest investors to our last employee are high fiving the shit out of us. Right. Thanking us for what an incredible job we've done. And now the only pressure is how much bigger can we make it? Now? We know at some point this probably does have to turn into revenue, but nobody's busting our balls about it right now. Ok? Because we still have more suckers in front of us. And now when I say suckers, I don't mean we're trying to like do anything evil. I'm saying there's another person at the next round of capital that's willing to continue to believe that bet they're the next sucker in the last round. It was Tiger Global and it was Soft Bank. They were the last sucker. Now, they're super smart. I wanna be clear like these, these, these guys know what they're doing, but they thought unfortunately that there would be another sucker after them and that person would essentially be John Q public, the stock buyer, right? And they were wrong. And so Tire Global and Softbank put Ungu the amounts of money. They were the last big check you could get and everybody wanted some of that because they knew that the those guys were at the end of the line, then they took their products to the public markets and then the investment guys, you know, the east coast guys were like, you know what, it just kind of looks like, bullshit to me.

Ryan Rutan: 120 X multiples on real estate. Um

Wil Schroter: Yeah. Yeah. In the market being both, you know, the investment bankers that took it out, they stand to make money so maybe they're willing to take a ride. The average person buying stock eventually was like, what the hell? And they're the ones who got sold out. They're the ones who bought at a dollar and sold at a penny. Right point is up until that point, Ryan, you and I are getting high fives everywhere. Ringing the bell,

Ryan Rutan: Sour Bucks is ringing the bell at NASDAQ. Right. That's exactly it. Right. Like this is like, it's everything looks great, right. You're building momentum with the company, you're building bigger staff. It is all the things that we, we need to make this vision come true. We're about to reach panacea. We're about to break through. Once this thing gets big enough, then, you know, we'll turn the corner revenue will continue to increase. We'll no longer have to keep adding costs, the burn rate will slow down. Right. Everybody will know about us. It's all gonna be Shangri La and then it's just not right. And, and in some cases, look, it's not even a fundamental issue with the model. Right. In the case of, of we work, there was a fundamental issue there in terms of what they were trying to do from a valuation versus asset value standpoint. Right. There's just no way you can get those multiples out of real estate. On the other hand, right now, of course, they had service models or other things they were going to do to try to pad that, but it didn't pan out with something like a new Uber, right. It can still go wrong. Right. Or it can still, it doesn't have to go as well as it did. Right. Ask Lyft or any of the other 850 people that were in, you know, raising serious money. Right. There were a ton of people raising serious money, right. Fifties, hundreds of millions of dollars for ride sharing apps and most of them are gone. Right. There's Uber and there's Lyft otherwise known as when Uber doesn't show up it, that's the reality at this point for them. That's not what they were aiming for. And, you know, they didn't raise as much money, they didn't go as far with it. So they're not over their skis necessarily, but things can happen. Right. These are, they're still risky businesses even with that much money and potentially, especially with that much money, right. It allows you to make bigger bets which can lead to big wins, but can also lead to really, really big and catastrophic losses. But again, comes out in hindsight sure is shit a lot harder to see when you're steering the ship towards

Wil Schroter: it. There are two people that, that get left holding the bag, the employees and the stockholders. Now, usually those come at two different times, the employees on the lead up to the IP O if there even is one. And then of course, the stockholders, I'm not talking about the early investors. I'm talking about the average person that buys the stock post IP O but the employees typically, along the way, all their signs look good. I'm an engineer. I just got poached from Google. They gave me 30% over my salary. They gave me this amazing stock package. I keep hearing that our, our valuation is doubling every six months. This is the smartest decision I've ever made. I don't sit and look through the P and L I don't, I don't have access to the balance sheet as far as I'm concerned. I killed it. Like this was a great, like when you look at all those interviews for all the people that we work in that last documentary and they're like, these are all smart people and they're like, what the hell happened because as far as they're concerned, everything was going pretty well. In fact, it was going great on the flip side. Again. The last Suckers, you heard that Uber was amazing or you heard right? That there's a stock called Wish. That was like an incredibly, you know, bubbly company. You heard Wish was incredibly, it was gonna be the next Amazon like it was gonna take on Amazon and then five seconds later trading out like 30 cents a share. What happens in these things is the fallout happens so fast and it happens at such an epic level that it's what everybody focuses on back to my company where I've grown into $3 million and it's making a million dollars a year. If that thing flames out, who gives a shit, no one will ever know. But yours, you're big, you're a big, gigantic flame out that makes some headlines. And so that's, I think why, I think that's why we're so like, you know, disproportionately focused on it. You know what I mean? It's

Ryan Rutan: not actually fair either. Right? Because yeah, it did that and it failed. And now we're seeing, you know, 5000 people without jobs or 1000 people or 10,000 people without jobs. But we also have to go back to, why did you say yes in the first place? Right. So if you're one of the employees or you're somebody who bought the stock, why did you say yes. Right. Because you believed in it because even at the time, it represented something better than what you had to your point. A lot of those folks were jumping ship, not on the promise of a future value, but on what they were being offered currently, they were getting 30% over market salary. Right. They were getting a sweet stock deal which may be worth something someday, but at least the current valuation was worth plenty. So they made these decisions based on the objective of available data at the time. Same way the founders were right, the founders were doing what they could do based on the available objective data. We get to this point where there's catastrophic failure. The only reason it registers is because of the scale of it and, and the only reason they're scaled to it was because they tried to do something big and they failed at it right now. If you're Theranos. Yeah, that's bad. That's just fraud. That's nasty. Nobody likes that. But if you're somebody who jumped on to, we work and spent, I mean, it's not like they had a 12 month run. Right. They were there for years and plenty of people got paid plenty of money to run that company for a long time. And it was ok. Right. So they, they were making their money, they had their stocks, some of them did very well on the valuation changes and all that. So, I don't think it's entirely fair that we, we look at these things and we go, you know, ok. Well, as opposed to what, like, let's say you left Google to go work at, at wework. Right. And right. They flamed out. Right. So, if you'd stayed at Google, you'd still have your job unless you're one of the 10,000 people that got laid off last week. Right. This stuff happens everywhere. It only matters when all of a sudden it's somehow collected and, and packaged as a single thing as opposed to what it really was, which is 10,000 individual events happening to 10,000 individual people who now have to go and figure out their own individual lives, which is how it was gonna be anyways. So, the fact that we even get all worked up about these things is a little problematic for me. And again,

Wil Schroter: I know we're in the business of defending founders. So I'll stay on that thread. All the founders that I talked to that have been through this at the top have raised, you know, things have gone up and down. I always see contrition always across the board. They're like, you know, I screwed that up. And again, we tend to think that they're these just arrogant jerks like I hate to say it, but Adam Newman kind of has that air that he was like, you know, but even he's shown a lot of contrition since then, or Travis from Uber, like, you know, if you get those guys in private, those are much different to ski. And I gotta tell you having talked to a lot of people, especially right now that are founders who raised a, a god awful amount of money and have kind of gotten over their skis. They all wish they could reverse course, none of them will, will come to you and say, of course, this was the right decision. Here's what they say. And I, and I agree with this, they said, I tried to take a very prescriptive path that's worked for many, many, many successful companies before me. And they had the right time and they had the right guidance and it worked and they're the stuff of legend. There are the products that, that you had the, the, the apps on your phone, et cetera. I did the exact same thing with obviously different products, but my timing wasn't right. My guidance may have not been right. And at the end of the day, I failed, but in just a harpy in just a heartbeat, I could have been any one of those companies and that's what we're looking at. We're looking at a playbook that does work for an infant, fantastical amount of companies. But when it doesn't, we compare them to all the other companies and it's just not fair to the founders, not fair to what the intention was. And I think Ryan at the end of the day, I think they tried to do the right thing and they just simply failed. So in addition to all the stuff related to founder groups, you've also got full access to everything on startups dot com. That includes all of our education tracks, which will be funding customer acquisition, even how to manage your monthly finances. They're so much stuff in there. All of our software including BIZ plan for putting together detailed business plans and financials launch rock for attracting early customers and of course, fund for attracting investment capital. When you log into the startups dot com site, you'll find all of these resources available.

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